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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction lies in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j).

This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge David S.

Young of the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, dismissing
the

Amended

Complaint

of

the

Plaintiffs, owners

of

Foothill

Federated Corporation (hereinafter "Owners") as to the Defendants
State

of

Utah

and

Utah

Department

of

Financial

Institution

(hereinafter "DFI" or "the State").
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. S 7-2-15(1)(d)
(1) The following obligations, expenses, and
claims have the following priority:
(d) fourth, claims of depositors, other than
those of controlling persons, as defined in
Section 7-8a-9. Any federal deposit insurance
agency or other deposit insurer is subrogated
to all rights of the depositors against the
institution, its officers and directors, and
its control persons as defined in Section 7-1103 to the extent of all payments made for the
benefit of the depositors.
"Payments," as
used in this subsection, includes arrangements
by a federal deposit insurance agency for the
assumption
or
payment
of
the
deposit
liabilities by another institution whose

deposits are insured by a federal deposit
insurance agency. The right of any agency of
the United States insuring deposits or savings
obligations to be subrogated to the rights of
depositors upon payment of their claims may
not be less extensive than the law of the
United States provides with respect to
subrogation to the rights of depositors in
national banks.
For the purposes of this
section, a contractual commitment to advance
funds, including a standby letter of credit,
may not be considered a deposit liability of
the institution;
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs

Corporation.

were

the

owners

of

Foothill

Financial

Amended Complaint at page 2, para. 7-8.

2. Foothill Financial Corporation was seized on April 4, 1987
by DFI and virtually all of its assets were acquired by Zions First
National Bank.
3.

Amended Complaint at page 4, para. 18.

As part

of this transaction, plaintiffs

agreed to

indemnify Zions First National Bank against certain potential
losses.
4.

Amended Complaint at page 5, para. 19.
Plaintiffs second claim for relief makes the claim that

the transaction

and

indemnification mentioned

above made the

plaintiffs deposit insurers and therefore entitled to recovery as
such from the State and DFI.

Amended Complaint at page 6, para.

25-27.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs, in their petition for rehearing, ask this
Court to delete one sentence from this Court's decision in this
matter on the basis that the sentence in question is dictum.
The sentence is not dictum, but an important part of this
Court's decision affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for
2

statutory entitlement.
That the challenged sentence is part of a second reason given
by the Court for dismissing a certain cause of action does not make
it dictum.

This Court properly looked to the merits of the

plaintiffs' statutory entitlement claim and ruled against the
plaintiffs on the merits.
The question of whether or not the owners of a thrift who gave
a guarantee to indemnify the insured institution that acquired
their thrift are deposit insurers was properly before the Court.
The Court correctly held that the plaintiffs were not deposit
insurers.
The powers that the federal Congress may have given to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. are immaterial to the question
under the laws of the State of Utah as to whether or not the owners
of a thrift are insurers of the deposits in that thrift under state
law.

Special provisions of state law that pertain solely to

federal deposit insurance agencies are also immaterial.
ARGUMENT
In their Petition for Rehearing, Plaintiffs seek the deletion
of a single sentence which is alleged by them to be merely dictum.
This is not correct.

The sentence that offends the plaintiffs is

an integral part of this Court's holding in this matter.
Plaintiff's second claim for relief was one of statutory
entitlement.

Plaintiff's/

as

owners

of

Foothill

Financial

Corporation, gave Zion's First National Bank a guarantee that they
would indemnify Zion's for any losses it might incur in taking over
3

the majority of the assets of Foothill Financial Corporation.
Plaintiffs' allege that this agreement made the plaintiffs
deposit insurers, and that therefore the plaintiffs have a claim
for statutory entitlement based on Utah Code Ann. $ 7-8a-8, which
sets the amount of the guaranty of depositors' funds.
In rejecting this claim, this Court set forth two reasons why
the plaintiffs' claim must fail.

The first reason was that the

plaintiffs sought to bring the action against the State and DFI as
alter egos of the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC).
This Court held that such a statutory entitlement claim should have
been made directly against the State and could not rest on the
alter ego theory. Prows v. State of Utah 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24
(Utah 1991).
The

second

reason

for

affirming

the

dismissal

of

the

plaintiffs' statutory entitlement claim was:
Second, even if it was made directly against
the State, plaintiffs do not have a valid
statutory entitlement claim. Section 7-8a-8
guarantees depositors' accounts, not the
reimbursement of thrift institution owners,
in their brief to this court, plaintiffs claim
they may recover under section 7-2-15(1)(d),
which provides, "Any federal deposit insurance
agency or other deposit insurer is subrogated
to all rights of the depositors to the extent
of all payments made for the benefit of the
depositors. ..."
Plaintiffs were not a
federal deposit insurance agency or other
deposit insurer, however, and cannot rely on
section 7-8-2-15(1)(d) to subrogate themselves
to the rights of the depositors.
Prows, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24.
quoted

paragraph

unnecessary dictum.

is

the

one

that

The last sentence of this
the

plaintiffs

claim

is

Far from being dictum, the offending passage

is an integral part of the ruling on the merits in this action. It
restates what the Court said in the first two sentences of the
paragraph; that the plaintiffs do not have a valid claim for
statutory entitlement under Utah Code Ann. §7-8a-8.
The question of whether or not the plaintiffs, as thrift
owners,

could

state

a

valid

cause

of

action

for

statutory

entitlement pursuant to this statute was properly before this
Court. This was one of the plaintiffs' three claims for relief and
was properly addressed by the Court.

While this Court may have

found other fatal defects with the plaintiffs pleadings that would
justify affirming the lower court's dismissal of this cause of
action; it cannot be said that this Court's explanation of the
reasons for dismissing a third of the plaintiffs' amended complaint
are merely dicta.
Plaintiffs claim that this passage "substantially prejudices
Plaintiffs' claim in the Utah Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation
("ILGC") liquidation proceeding now pending in Utah Third District
Court."

Appellants' Petition for Re-Hearing at page 1.

To remove the one sentence in question would not alter this
reality.
seek

This Court held that the section under which plaintiffs

payment

"guarantees

depositors'

accounts,

not

the

reimbursement of thrift institution owners." Prows, 162 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 24. To obtain the result they seek, plaintiffs would have
to ask this Court to strike its second grounds for dismissal of the
statutory entitlement claim in its entirety.
While it is true that the passage in question is part of the

5

second reason presented by the Court for the dismissal of the
statutory entitlement claim, that does not make it dictum.

It is

normal and proper for courts to provide more than one valid
rationale in support of the decision that they reach.
Plaintiffs also allege that the passage in question is dictum
because it addresses the question of whether the plaintiffs could
have stated a valid claim directly against the State and DFI, as
opposed to one based on the ILGC being an alter ego of the State
and DFI. The factual basis of the claim would be unchanged.

This

Court appropriately recognized that the adequacy of a cause of
action is to be determined by consideration of the substance of the
allegations made, rather than by particular legal labels which the
pleader chooses to affix to them.
The substance of the pleading and the nature
of the issues which are raised, rather than
the pleader's designation of the cause of
action, control the issue.
Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 1983). Plaintiffs, by
this argument, seek a second day in court. They ask this Court to
strike part of its decision

so as to provide plaintiffs an

opportunity to reargue the very issue again in a separate lawsuit.
Plaintiffs seek to have two chances for success.

They argue that

this Court's decision that they were not deposit insurers was in
error, and they also argue that the question should not be before
this Court but be preserved to be decided in future litigation.
The question of whether or not the plaintiffs were deposit
insurers was raised by the parties and presented to this Court.
Brief of Respondents State of Utah and Department of Financial
6

Institutions at pages 23-24; Reply Brief at pages 2, 11-12. This
Court properly decided the issue.
In seeking to show this Court that it erred in holding that
plaintiffs were not deposit insurers, plaintiffs rely on two
different

statutes.

Plaintiffs

point out that

12 U.S.C. S

1823(c)(2)(A) gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) the
power to provide

a company

acquiring

control of an insured

institution a guarantee which plaintiffs allege is similar or
identical to the guarantee that the plaintiffs gave to Zion's First
National Bank.
plaintiffs

claim

Because the FDIC has this similar authority,
that

it

shows they were acting

as deposit

insurers.
Plaintiffs analogy is faulty.

12 U.S.C. S 1823 (c)(1) also

authorizes the FDIC "to make loans to, to make deposits in, to
purchase the assets or securities of, to assume the liabilities of,
or to make contributions to, any insured depository institution.
..."

Under plaintiffs' reasoning

anyone making

such loans,

deposits or purchases would also qualify as a deposit insurer.
Just because the FDIC has certain powers does not make all private
persons performing similar actions into deposit insurers.
The second statute upon which plaintiffs rely is that portion
of Utah Code Ann. S 7-2-15(1)(d) which reads:
... "Payments," as used in this subsection,
includes arrangements by a federal deposit
insurance agency for the assumption or payment
of the deposit
liabilities by another
institution whose deposits are insured by a
federal deposit insurance agency. The right
of any agency of the United States insuring
deposits or savings obligations to be
7

subrogated to the rights of depositors upon
payment of their claims may not be less
extensive than the law of the United States
provides with respect to subrogation to the
rights of depositors in national banks.
Even

though

the

statute

is

expressly

limited

in

its

application to federal deposit insurance agencies, plaintiffs seek
to extend it to claim that their actions in giving a guarantee to
Zions First National Bank made them deposit insurers.
contrary to the wording of this very statute.

This is

The sentence just

before this in the statute states:
Any federal deposit insurance agency or other
deposit insurer is subrogated to all rights of
the depositors against the institution, its
officers and directors, and its control
persons as defined in Section 7-1-103 to the
extent of all payments made for the benefit of
the depositors.
(Emphasis added.)
term

"payments"

If the legislature had intended that the

(in the sentence upon which plaintiffs rely)

include acts performed by private parties such as plaintiffs as
well as federal deposit insurance agencies, the legislature could
easily have changed the sentence to read:
"Payments," as used in this subsection,
includes arrangements by a federal deposit
insurance agency [or other deposit insurer]
for the assumption or payment of the deposit
liabilities by another institution whose
deposits are insured by a federal deposit
insurance agency.
(The emphasized language has been added, it is not in the
actual statute.) The fact that the legislature did not see fit to
add these four words to this sentence while using them in the
previous sentence is an indication that this special provision is

8

only to be applied to federal deposit insurance agencies.
This reading of the statute is supported by the very next
sentence in the statute*

This next sentence speaks succinctly of

the special rights of federal deposit insurance agencies, and not
of the rights that might be granted to "other deposit insurers".
Defendants State and DFI submit that the challenged ruling of
this Court was properly reached based on the issues presented to
this Court in this action.

That the challenged decision of this

Court is correct and should not be striken or changed.
For these reasons, the State of Utah and its Department of
Financial Institutions respectfully ask this Court to deny the
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted this
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant State
of Utah and Department of
Financial Institutions
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of September, 1991.
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DENNIS K. POOLE
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR.
POOLE & VOROS, P.C.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
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